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Executive Summary
West Virginia’s economy is concentrated in energy-producing and energy-consuming sectors. The
state’s energy-intensive economy evolved in response to abundant supplies of comparatively low-cost
energy — coal, natural gas, and electricity. Thus, the state and the welfare of its residents are
particularly sensitive to events that change the behavior of energy markets.
There are presently several prospective changes in public policy that could have large effects on coal
and electricity markets in West Virginia and nationally. A natural response to any of these recent or
prospective policies is to ask, “What kind of impacts will this have in West Virginia’s energy markets?”
Furthermore, “With the state economy so dependent on energy-intensive industries, what could this
policy do to broader measures of state economic activity, such as employment, GSP, personal
incomes, or population?” This report addresses those questions for the Kyoto Protocol. Companion
reports examine the impacts on West Virginia’s economy of Phase II SO2 restrictions under Title IV of
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and of EPA’s NOx SIP Call.
The Kyoto Protocol
During the United Nations Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro in 1992, 154 states signed the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to promote climate stabilization through control of
greenhouse gas emissions. Since then the parties to the Convention have held periodic formal
conferences to review progress and negotiate further agreements. During the conference in Kyoto,
participating countries negotiated a set of greenhouse gas emissions targets for the years 2008 through
2012 and agreed in principle to various so-called “flexibility” mechanisms that countries can use to help
meet the targets. This agreement is known as the Kyoto Protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol’s emissions targets apply to 38 developed countries listed in Annex B of the
Protocol. The targets cover six gases — carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N 2O),
sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). The permitted
level of emissions for each of the six gases for each participating country is set as a percentage change
from the country’s emissions in a base year. For carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, the base
year is 1990, and for the other three gases a country can choose a base year of 1990 or 1995. The
United States agreed to a 7 percent reduction.
Total emissions of the six gases are usually expressed as metric tons of carbon equivalent, based on the
carbon content of carbon dioxide. In 1990 the United States’ total greenhouse gas emissions were
1,618 million metric tons, of which 1,346 million metric tons (83 percent) came from combustion of
energy fuels. The Energy Information Administration forecasts that without the Kyoto Protocol, energyrelated carbon emissions by 2010 would be 33 percent greater than in 1990 and 43 percent greater by
2020.
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Fortunately, the Kyoto Protocol includes agreement in principle for several flexibility mechanisms that
can be used to reduce compliance costs. First, there is some flexibility in timing. The emission targets
apply to the average over the five-year period rather than to any single year. Second, the countries are
free to substitute reductions in one of the six greenhouse gases for reductions in any of the others using
the carbon equivalents. Third, the Protocol allows credit for carbon sinks “resulting from direct humaninduced land-use change and forestry activities ... since 1990.” The Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility
mechanisms also include three types of international exchange. First, Annex B countries may trade
carbon permits among themselves. Second, the Clean Development Mechanism allows Annex B
countries to claim credit for verified greenhouse gas emission reductions that result from participation in
projects located in developing countries. Third, a Joint Implementation provision allows Annex B
countries to share credit for emission-reducing projects conducted jointly.
Prospects for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol are uncertain. Participating countries are still
negotiating details for most of the flexibility mechanisms. Conflict has emerged over the interpretation of
the Protocol’s provisions for several of these mechanisms. Although many countries, including the U.S.
have signed the Protocol, no developed country has yet to formally ratify it.
Study Process
There are three basic elements that must be brought together in a specific logical sequence to produce
the impact estimates. The first of these is a model of West Virginia’s economy that consists of a
mathematical representation of the relationships among different parts of the economy — household
consumption, investment, production, employment, wages, prices, incomes, population migration,
production costs, and so forth. This study uses the REMI model of West Virginia’s economy. The
second basic element is a baseline scenario that describes what West Virginia’s economy would look
like without the Kyoto Protocol. Running the baseline scenario through the REMI model creates a
control forecast. The third basic element in the study process is a policy scenario describing the direct
effects the Kyoto Protocol would have on West Virginia’s economy. The study used four types of
information to develop the Kyoto Protocol scenario. These were: 1) official descriptions of the Kyoto
Protocol in publications of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change; 2) energy industry statistical profiles, primarily from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration; 3) prior studies of the Kyoto Protocol or related proposals; and 4) advice from
members of an Advisory Board convened for the study. The final stage in the study process was to use
the REMI model to simulate an alternative forecast based on the Kyoto Protocol scenario. Comparing
the policy scenario forecast with the control forecast reveals the estimated economic impacts of the
Kyoto Protocol.
Economic impacts are changes in the level of activity or some other attribute (e.g., wage rates) of an
economy that are attributable to some policy or event. Impacts are not the same as benefits or costs. In
benefit-cost studies a benefit is the amount people would be willing to pay to make a specific event
happen or to acquire a good or service. A cost is the amount people would be willing to pay to avoid
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occurrence of a specific event or to avoid giving up something of value. (This definition of cost is
different from, but related to, the common definition of cost as what someone pays to acquire
something.) An impact may be a benefit (lower food prices), a cost (increased incidence of illness
requires greater expenditures on health care), or neither (employment shifts from one industry to
another with no change in wage rates).
Direct Impact Scenario
The Kyoto Protocol’s aggregate impact on the national economy can be represented as a loss of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) relative to an alternative national baseline without implementation of the
Protocol. This study uses one of several scenarios from the Energy Information Administration (EIA).
The specific EIA scenario is defined by actual U.S. CO2 emissions in the 2008 to 2012 period equal to
the U.S. 1990 reference plus 14 percent.
However, the direct impacts on West Virginia go beyond a general decline in national GDP because the
burden of compliance is focused on energy-producing and intensively energy-consuming sectors,
especially when the energy comes from carbon-intensive fuels such as coal. The scenario includes less
coal mining, reduced production of electricity at the state’s generating plants, and disappearance of
West Virginia’s advantage from relatively low-cost electricity. For businesses, especially electricityintensive manufacturing industries, this means an increase in operating costs which will lead to a loss in
competitiveness. For households, this means a higher cost of living that effectively reduces the value of
real incomes.
Adapting to the Kyoto Protocol involves changes to plant and equipment that embody greater energyefficiency and less carbon-intensity. Therefore, anticipation of Protocol implementation will begin to
have economic impacts several years before 2008. The scenario modeled in this report branches off
from the baseline in 2005.
Change in GDP:
-0.4% in 2005
-1.7% in 2010
-0.5% in 2020
Change in Appalachian Coal Production:
-5.4% in 2005
-25.5% in 2010
-35.6% in 2020
Change in Electricity Production:
-9.9% in 2005
-38.7% in 2010
-63.5% in 2020
Electricity Prices
Converge to U.S. average over the period
2005 to 2010
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The Kyoto Protocol would have some additional direct impacts on West Virginia’s economy that are
not in the direct impact scenario because information on their magnitudes is limited. These include a shift
in national markets away from energy-intensive products, direct costs for non-utility industries (e.g.,
primary metals, mining) that emit greenhouse gases, expansion and modification of forestry to act as a
carbon sink, and avoided costs of global warming.
The Kyoto Protocol direct impact scenario used in this report is a plausible representation of the
policy’s effects on West Virginia’s economy, but it does not represent a firm prediction of the actual
direct impacts that will occur. There are several sources of uncertainty. First, it is unlikely that the
Kyoto Protocol will be adopted in anything like its present form. Second, negotiations continue over
rules for implementing many of the Protocol’s flexibility provisions. In addition, debate over the national
costs and economic impacts of implementing the Protocol has been vigorous.
Economic Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol
Table ES below summarizes results from the study.
Table ES
Economic Impacts of Kyoto Protocol
2005
Output (millions of 1992 $)

2010

2015

2020

-1,371

-5,895

-7,365

-7,959

-848

-3,721

-4,675

-5,079

-8,800

-42,800

-47,800

-42,700

Annual Wage Rate ($)

-120

-905

-1,443

-1,510

Wages & Salaries (millions $)

-325

-2,103

-3,023

-3,188

Per Capita Income (1992 $)

-127

-393

-191

-1

-2,400

-28,800

-51,200

-66,100

GSP (millions of 1992 $)
Employment

Population
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Introduction: West Virginia’s Energy Intensive Economy
West Virginia’s economy is concentrated in energy-producing and energy-consuming sectors. The
state’s energy-intensive economy evolved in response to abundant supplies of comparatively low-cost
energy — coal, natural gas, and electricity. For example, in 1997 industrial customers in West Virginia
paid an average of $2.91 per thousand cubic feet for natural gas compared to $3.59 nationally, 1 and in
1998 they paid an average of 3.8 ¢/kWh (cents per kilowatthour) for electricity compared to 4.5
¢/kWh nationally.2
Table 1 illustrates the importance of energy to West Virginia’s economy with data on employment,
employee earnings, and gross state product (GSP) for selected industries in 1997. Coal mining, oil and
gas extraction, natural gas distribution, and electricity are the state’s major energy-producing industries.
West Virginia sold 70.4% of its electricity generated in 1998 and 83.1% of its coal production in 1997
out-of-state.3 So in addition to being large, electricity and coal are important parts of the state’s export
base. The four manufacturing industries (out of twenty) in Table 1 each include sectors that spend over
5% of their revenues on electricity purchases. Primary aluminum spends 20.5%, cement 10.6%, carbon
and graphite products 5.5%, and reconstituted wood products 5.5% of revenues on electricity. 4
Combined, just the eight listed energy-intensive industries accounted for 9.7% of employment, 24.0%
of employee earnings, and 27.1% of GSP in the entire state economy!
Because large parts of West Virginia’s economy are based on abundant, low-cost energy, the state and
the welfare of its residents are particularly sensitive to events that change the behavior of energy
markets. There are presently several prospective changes in public policy that could have large effects
on coal and electricity markets in West Virginia and nationally. Most, but not all, of these are proposed
or pending environmental regulations. These prospective policy changes include: 1) the Kyoto Protocol
to limit emissions of greenhouse gases, notably CO2; 2) the start in 2000 of Phase II of the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments (CAAA) restrictions on SO2 emissions to control acid rain; 3) the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) NOx State Implementation Plan (SIP) Call, which would
require the state to reduce NOx emissions; 4) additional restrictions on the scope of mountaintop
removal coal mining and associated valley fills; 5) restructuring of electricity markets and the

1

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Annual 1997, October 1998, Table

27.
2

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual 1998 Volume 1, Table

A15.
3

Computed from data in U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual
1998 Volume 1, Tables A1 and A11 and Coal Industry Annual 1997, Tables 61 and 62.
4

Minnesota IMPLAN Group, 1994 U.S. Structural Matrices.
1

introduction of competition;5 and 6) rail competition leading to lower costs of transporting low-sulfur
coal from Wyoming’s Powder River Basin. A natural response to any of these recent or prospective
policies is to ask, “What kind of impacts will this have in West Virginia’s energy markets?”
Furthermore, “With the state economy so dependent on energy-intensive industries, what could this
policy do to broader measures of state economic activity, such as employment, GSP, personal
incomes, or population?”
This report addresses those questions for the Kyoto Protocol. Companion reports examine the impacts
on West Virginia’s economy of Phase II SO2 restrictions under Title IV of the CAAA and of EPA’s
NOx SIP Call. 6 The next section describes the Kyoto Protocol. The following section gives an
overview of the process used in this study, including subsections describing the REMI model of West
Virginia’s economy, and discussing the nature and interpretation of impacts. The fourth section details
the scenario used to describe the Kyoto Protocol’s direct impacts and contains a subsection about
potential alternatives to the selected scenario. The body of the report concludes with total (economywide) impact estimates for a variety of variables. An appendix covers some of the technical details
encountered in developing the direct impact scenario.

The Kyoto Protocol
During the United Nations Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro in 1992, 154 states signed the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to promote climate stabilization through control of
greenhouse gas emissions. Since then the parties to the Convention have held periodic formal
conferences to review progress and negotiate further agreements. These sessions of the Conference of
the Parties have been held at Berlin in 1995 (COP-1), at Geneva in 1996 (COP-2), at Kyoto in 1997
(COP-3), and at Buenos Aires in 1998 (COP-4). As this report was being edited, another conference
took place in Bonn (COP-5).7
5

For more on issues pertaining to electric industry restructuring in West Virginia, see West
Virginia University, Electric Industry Restructuring Research Group, Electric Industry Restructuring:
Opportunities and Risks for West Virginia, Reports 1-5, various dates July 1997 through September
1998.
6

Greenstreet, David, Impacts of Phase II SO2 Emission Restrictions on West Virginia’s
Economy, West Virginia University, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, December 1999 and
Greenstreet, David, Impacts of the NOx SIP Call on West Virginia’s Economy, West Virginia
University, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, December 1999.
7

Resources for the Future’s Weathervane web site, http://www.weathervane.rff.org/, is a
convenient site to track developments regarding the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S. Energy Information
Administration has several useful reports discussing the Protocol, including Impacts of the Kyoto
Protocol on U.S. Energy Markets and Economic Activity, International Energy Outlook 1998,
2

During the conference in Kyoto, participating countries negotiated a set of greenhouse gas emissions
targets for the years 2008 through 2012 and agreed in principle to various so-called “flexibility”
mechanisms that countries can use to help meet the targets. This agreement is known as the Kyoto
Protocol. The emissions targets apply to 38 countries listed in Annex B (often referred to as Annex I
countries from the original UNFCCC, although there are a few differences). The Annex B countries
consist of most developed countries (e.g., OECD members except Korea and Mexico) and some of
the formerly communist countries in transition to market economies. Developing countries, notably
China and India, resisted emission targets on grounds of equity (their per capita emissions are presently
much lower) and the urgency of economic development.
The Protocol’s emission targets cover six gases — carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous
oxide (N 2O), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs).
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) are covered under the earlier
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. The permitted level of emissions for
each of the six gases for each participating country is set as a percentage change from the country’s
emissions in a base year. For carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, the base year is 1990, and
for the other three gases a country can choose 1990 or 1995 as a base year. Carbon dioxide is emitted
in greater quantities than the other five gases, but they have larger Greenhouse Warming Potentials
(GWPs) than carbon dioxide.8 Total emissions of the six gases are usually expressed as metric tons of
carbon equivalent, based on the carbon content of carbon dioxide. In 1990 the United States’ total
greenhouse gas emissions were 1,618 million metric tons, of which 1,346 million metric tons (83
percent) came from combustion of energy fuels.9
The percentage change from the base year permitted by the agreed emission targets varies among the
38 countries. The European Union countries collectively are supposed to reduce emissions by 8
percent, the United States by 7 percent, and Canada and Japan by 6 percent. New Zealand, Russia,
and the Ukraine are supposed to match their 1990 emissions. A few countries are allowed increases —
Iceland 10 percent, Australia 8 percent, and Norway 1 percent. Further emissions targets are planned
after the 2008 through 2012 commitment period, but their levels have not yet been negotiated.

and Annual Energy Outlook 1999. See the EIA’s greenhouse gas web page at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/env/ghg.html. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s official
site is at http://www.unfccc.de/ .
8

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Sinks: 1990-1997, April 1999 and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change
1995: The Science of Climate Change, 1996 (part of the Second Assessment Report).
9

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United
States 1996, October 1997.
3

Of course, for most countries the effort required to reduce emissions is much greater than these figures
suggest, because two decades of economic and population growth would ordinarily lead to greater
emissions.10 The EIA forecasts that without the Kyoto Protocol, energy-related carbon emissions by
2010 would be 33 percent greater than in 1990 and 43 percent greater by 2020.11 Thus, without using
any of the flexibility mechanisms described below, forecast emissions would have to be reduced by 30
percent in 2010 and 35 percent in 2020 to meet the United States’ target under the Kyoto Protocol.
Fortunately, the Kyoto Protocol includes agreement in principle for several flexibility mechanisms that
can be used to reduce compliance costs. First, there is some flexibility in timing. The emission targets
apply to the average over the five-year period rather than to any single year. In addition, Annex B
countries can bank carbon emission allocations from overcompliance during one commitment period
and use them in a later commitment period. Second, the countries are free to substitute reductions in
one of the six greenhouse gases for reductions in any of the others using the carbon equivalents based
on GWPs. Third, the Protocol allows credit for carbon sinks “resulting from direct human-induced
land-use change and forestry activities ... since 1990.” However the forestry is limited to “afforestation,
reforestation, and deforestation,” and the Protocol is ambiguous regarding treatment of other types of
carbon sinks.
The Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms also include three types of international exchange. First,
Annex B countries may trade carbon permits among themselves. However, the European Union is
trying to limit the extent to which a country can rely upon such trading, while the United States is trying
to expand the scope of international trading by somehow involving the developing countries. Second,
the Clean Development Mechanism allows Annex B countries to claim credit for verified greenhouse
gas emission reductions that result from participation in projects located in developing countries. Third,
a Joint Implementation provision allows Annex B countries to share credit for emission-reducing
projects conducted jointly.
Prospects for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol are uncertain. The Conference of Parties is still
negotiating details for most of the flexibility mechanisms. Conflict has emerged over the interpretation of
the Protocol’s provisions for several of these mechanisms. Although many countries, including the U.S.,
have signed the Protocol, no developed country has yet to formally ratify it. To take effect, the Protocol
must be ratified by at least 55 countries, including Annex B countries accounting for at least 55% of that
10

The exceptions include Russia, the Ukraine, and parts of eastern Europe (notably the East
German part of the EU “bubble”) where economic disruptions and the profligate use of energy under
Communist rule has lead to reductions in emissions. The extra carbon emissions allocated to these
countries — sometimes referred to as “hot air” — could be available for sale under international permit
trading, but this is contentious and a subject of further negotiation.
11

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy
Markets and Economic Activity, October 1998, page 21.
4

group’s 1990 CO2 emissions. Furthermore, the U.S. Senate is on record through a formal resolution as
opposing any treaty limiting greenhouse gas emissions unless developing countries, such as China and
India, “meaningfully participate.”

Study Process
Figure 1, provided by REMI, summarizes the process for estimating economic impacts used in this
study. There are three basic elements that must be brought together in a specific logical sequence to
produce the impact estimates. The first of these is a model of West Virginia’s economy that consists of
a mathematical representation of the relationships among different parts of the economy — household
consumption, investment, production, employment, wages, prices, incomes, population migration,
production costs, and so forth. This permits analysis of how a change in one part of the economy, an
increase in electricity prices for example, propagates throughout the entire economy by way of these
relationships. This study uses the REMI model of West Virginia’s economy, as represented by the
center box in Figure 1.12 The following subsection describes the structure of the REMI model in more
detail.
The second basic element is a baseline scenario that describes what West Virginia’s economy would
look like without the Kyoto Protocol. The upper right-side box in Figure 1 shows that this baseline
scenario is described in terms of values of policy variables. Policy variables consist of the settings —
equation parameters, initial values of economic variables, and forecasts of exogenous conditions in the
national economy — that the REMI model uses as input in order to simulate an annual forecast of the
state’s economy. The control forecast represented in the lower right-side box is simulated from the
baseline scenario’s predicted values for policy variables. REMI comes with a default baseline scenario
and control forecast extrapolated from current economic conditions without any changes in public
policy or external factors.
For this study the baseline scenario and control forecast contain one change from the REMI default.
Coal from Wyoming’s Powder River Basin (PRB) is inexpensive to mine and low in sulfur, but has a
high ash content and is remote from most markets. Due to improvements in rail transportation and finetuning of electric generating unit boilers, PRB coal is becoming increasingly competitive in Midwestern
and even Eastern markets. At the same time, inflation-adjusted national coal mine revenues will be flat
or decreasing. Even though tons of coal produced has increased at an annual average rate of 1.5%
nationally between 1988 and 1997 (2.0% in West Virginia), falling prices mean that real (i.e. inflation-

12

The specific version is REMI Policy Insight, WV State Model EDFS-53, Version 1.0
released September 1998, which is calibrated with historical data through 1996.
5

adjusted) revenues have decreased at an annual average rate of -3.6% (-1.6% in West Virginia).13
Furthermore, there are almost no announced plans for investments in new coal-fired electric generating
units in spite of continued growth in the market for electricity.
Consequently, REMI’s baseline forecast of 1.0% annual growth from 1996 to 2020 in West Virginia
real coal revenues appears much too optimistic. Instead, the adjusted baseline forecast for this study
assumes that real revenues from in-state and foreign coal shipments remain steady. Revenues from outof-state domestic coal shipments are assumed to decrease from 1996 by 5% in 2000, 15% by 2010,
and 20% by 2020. Since 1997 domestic out-of-state coal shipments were 60.75% of all coal
shipments originating in West Virginia,14 this amounts to a decrease of 3.0% in real coal output by
2000, 9.1% by 2010, and 12.2% by 2020.
The third basic element in the study process is a policy scenario describing the direct effects that the
Kyoto Protocol would have on West Virginia’s economy. This is the top box in Figure 1. The upper
left-side box shows that this scenario has to be expressed in terms of the REMI model’s policy
variables. The study used four types of information to develop the Kyoto Protocol scenario and to
translate that scenario into policy variables that can be inserted into a REMI simulation. These were: 1)
official descriptions of the Kyoto Protocol in publications of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; 2) energy industry statistical profiles, primarily from
the U.S. Energy Information Administration; 3) prior studies of the Kyoto Protocol or related
proposals; and 4) advice from members of an Advisory Board convened for the study.
This study’s Advisory Board consisted of 21 individuals with a background in some aspect of West
Virginia’s energy markets or environmental policy. The members had diverse backgrounds including
state environmental and utility regulatory officials, representatives of the West Virginia Legislature and
Governor’s Office, electric utility staff, railroad coal market managers, representatives of mining and
manufacturing trade associations, an engineering consultant, a private lawyer specializing in
environmental issues, a union representative, members of environmental advocacy groups, and
academics. Fifteen of the Advisory Board members attended an afternoon seminar that included a
discussion of the Kyoto Protocol and the probable magnitudes of its direct impacts on the state
economy. Several members provided specific information based on their professional knowledge
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Free on board adjusted to 1992 dollars using the implicit Gross Domestic Product deflator.
Calculated from U.S. Energy Information Administration, Coal Industry Annual 1997, Tables 1 and
81.
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Computed from U.S. Energy Information Administration, Coal Industry Annual 1997,
Tables 58 and 61.
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and/or references to additional reports and sources of information. Each Advisory Board member
received a draft copy of this report for review. 15
The final stage in the study process, as represented by the lower left-side and bottom boxes in Figure 1,
is to use the REMI model to simulate an alternative forecast based on the Kyoto Protocol scenario.
Comparing the scenario forecast with the control forecast reveals the estimated economic impacts of
the Kyoto Protocol. These impacts were estimated for each year through 2020 and cover all the
various variables — household consumption, investment, production, employment, wages, prices,
incomes, population migration, production costs, and so forth — forecast by the REMI model.
The REMI Model
REMI is an economic-demographic forecasting and simulation model with thousands of equations and
policy variables. REMI is designed to forecast the impact of public policies and external events on the
state’s economy and population. As described in Figure 1 earlier in this section, any combination of the
policy variables can be modified to simulate the economic and demographic impacts of a policy
scenario. REMI includes blocks on: 1) output; 2) labor and capital demand; 3) population and labor
supply; 4) wages, prices, and profits; and 5) market shares.
Figure 2 schematically represents the major variables in each of these blocks and the relationships
among these variables. In Block 1, output in each of 53 sectors is determined by demand —
consumption, investment, government spending, and exports — and local market shares. Block 2
shows that factor demands for labor and capital depend on outputs and the wage rate. The real wage
rate and employment opportunities determine migration, and therefore population (by age and sex) and
labor supply in Block 3. In the fourth block employment demand and labor supply determine
employment opportunity and the wage rate. The wage rate, in turn, drives the real wage and production
costs, which determine profitability and prices, which affect consumer prices, which loop back to the
wage rate. In Block 5, local and export market shares depend on sectors’ profitability and sales prices.
Interpreting Impacts
Economic impacts are changes in the level of activity or some other attribute (e.g., wage rates) of an
economy that are attributable to some policy or event. Because an economy has many different
characteristics — output, employment, wage rates, prices, incomes — any policy will have many
different types of impacts. Regional economists distinguish between direct and total impacts. A direct
impact is any change in an economy whose immediate cause is the policy or event in question. In this
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Advisory Board members do not necessarily endorse the study’s conclusions. While many of
their comments were helpful, the author has sole responsibility for the final choices made in selecting the
policy scenario and estimating economic impacts.
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study direct impacts are represented as changes in the REMI policy variables, which make the policy
scenario forecast differ from the control forecast. A total impact is the final change in a characteristic of
the economy after all of the indirect influences work their way through the various components and
markets of the economy. With REMI, these total impacts are equivalent to differences between the
policy scenario and control forecasts.
Impacts are not the same as benefits or costs. In benefit-cost studies a benefit is the amount people
would be willing to pay to make a specific event happen or to acquire a good or service. A cost is the
amount people would be willing to pay to avoid occurrence of a specific event or to avoid giving up
something of value. The terms “benefit” and “cost” are also applied to the specific event, good, or
service, itself.16 Generally, benefits are based on either intrinsic value to a consumer (shoes, a car, more
leisure, cleaner air), or resources saved in an existing activity so that the resources can then be used for
something else (drivers’ time saved because of a road improvement). Costs generally derive from
something intrinsically undesirable (increased incidence of an illness), a reduction in something with
value, or something that increases the resources required for an existing activity.
Public policies should generally be justified in terms of their benefits exceeding costs. The payments do
not actually have to happen as long as individuals would be hypothetically willing to make them.
Benefits and costs may or may not be tradable in markets. An impact may be a benefit (lower food
prices), a cost (increased incidence of illness requires greater expenditures on health care), or neither
(employment shifts from one industry to another with no change in wage rates). Even when an impact is
associated with a benefit, their magnitudes need not be the same (a previously unemployed worker
gains a job — the job pays a salary [an impact] but is not worth as much to the worker because she
also loses leisure time).
This study addresses the potential economic impacts of the Kyoto Protocol. It makes no attempt to
assess the benefits or costs. In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, it happens that most of the costs appear
in economic markets and can be estimated from existing economic and cost engineering data (e.g.,
substituting fuels or investing in more energy-efficient equipment) and are therefore observable as
economic impacts. Quantifying most of the benefits, on the other hand, depends on still highly uncertain
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To see the connection between an economist’s definition of cost and the common definition,
consider the example of an individual who pays a dollar (common definition of cost) to buy an ice
cream cone on a hot day. Since a dollar is worth a dollar, the individual would be willing to pay up to a
dollar (economist’s definition of cost) in order to get the ice cream cone for “free” (i.e., to avoid giving
up the dollar used to pay for the cone). The individual may have been willing to pay up to two dollars
for the cone, making two dollars the benefit. If the individual had only been willing to pay up to fifty
cents for the cone, the purchase would not be made.
8

science, and in some cases (e.g., ecosystem preservation) the benefits are not tradable in markets. This
does not mean the benefits are not real; just that they are not as closely associated with the impacts that
can be modeled with the techniques used in this study.

Direct Impact Scenario
The Kyoto Protocol’s restrictions on CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions would have several
direct impacts on West Virginia’s economy. These direct impacts are quantified in the scenario
described in this section. This direct policy impact scenario can then be inserted into a REMI simulation
in order to estimate the indirect and total impacts the Kyoto Protocol might have on the state’s
economy.
Scenario Elements
Because implementing the Kyoto Protocol would be a national and global endeavor, its most important
direct effect on West Virginia’s economy would be to change the national and global economic context
in which the state operates. Kyoto’s aggregate impact on the national economy can be represented as a
loss of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) relative to an alternative national baseline without
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. However, the direct impacts on West Virginia go beyond a
general decline in national GDP because the burden of compliance is focused on energy producing and
intensively energy-consuming sectors, especially when the energy comes from carbon-intensive fuels
such as coal. The state’s economy is unusually concentrated in precisely those sectors (see the
Introduction). The policy scenario includes less coal mining, reduced production of electricity at the
state’s generating plants, and disappearance of West Virginia’s advantage from relatively low-cost
electricity. For businesses, especially electricity-intensive manufacturing industries, this means an
increase in operating costs which will lead to a loss in competitiveness. For households, this means a
higher cost of living that effectively reduces the value of real incomes.
There is a very wide variety of forecasts of the Protocol’s costs and impacts (see below). This study
uses one of several scenarios from the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The specific EIA
scenario is defined by actual U.S. CO2 emissions in the 2008 to 2012 period equal to the U.S. 1990
reference plus 14 percent.17,18 This EIA scenario was selected because the EIA’s National Energy
Modeling System is comprehensive and well-documented and the scenario includes published estimates
on impacts to coal-fired electricity generation and Appalachian coal production. Also, under this
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U.S. Energy Information Administration, Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy
Markets and Economic Activity, October 1998.
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The balance of compliance to meet the agreed target of 1990 minus 7 percent would be
accomplished through international trading in carbon emissions permits and credits for carbon sinks.
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scenario the EIA’s estimated carbon price — $129 per metric ton (1996 prices) — and carbon
emissions are similar to forecasts from several other credible sources that include Annex B trading,
carbon sinks, and offsets for the other greenhouse gases.19 Since signatories to the Kyoto Protocol
have agreed in principle to these flexibility mechanisms, this seems fairer than modeling a scenario based
on either no international emissions trading, as some opponents have done, or on trading with all
countries, as the Clinton Administration has done.
Adapting to the Kyoto Protocol involves changes to plant and equipment that embody greater energyefficiency and less carbon-intensity. Therefore, anticipation of Protocol implementation will begin to
have economic impacts several years before 2008. The scenario modeled in this report branches off
from the baseline in 2005.
Change in GDP:
-0.4% in 2005
-1.7% in 2010
-0.5% in 2020
Change in Appalachian Coal Production:
-5.4% in 2005
-25.5% in 2010
-35.6% in 2020
Change in Electricity Production:
-9.9% in 2005
-38.7% in 2010
-63.5% in 2020
Electricity Prices
Converge to U.S. average over the period
2005 to 2010
These translate into the following direct impacts entered into the REMI simulation:
Change in GDP:
-0.4% in 2005
-1.7% in 2010
-0.5% in 2020
Change in Mining Sales:
-4.6% in 2005
-21.7% in 2010
-30.3% in 2020
Change in Public Utilities Sales:
-7.9% in 2005
-31.0% in 2010
-50.8% in 2020
Industrial Electricity Costs:
+42.7% by 2010 and thereafter
Commercial Electricity Costs:
+39.3% by 2010 and thereafter
Price of Household Operating Expenses:
+6.3% by 2010 and thereafter
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U.S. Energy Information Administration, Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy
Markets and Economic Activity, October 1998, Chapter 7, especially pages 141, 144-146.
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Elements Not Included
The Kyoto Protocol would have some additional direct impacts on West Virginia’s economy that are
not included because information on their magnitudes is limited. Fortunately, these are usually not as
large as the changes in national GDP and in energy markets, and in some instances their effects overlap
with the direct impacts that are in the scenario.
First, the national economy would change in additional ways that affect the state. Even with switching
towards lower-carbon fuels and more energy-efficient technologies, the price of energy would increase.
This, in turn, will cause an increase in the prices of energy-intensive goods — anything with large
quantities of aluminum, for example. In response, consumers and businesses will tend to substitute less
energy-intensive goods and services for those that are more energy-intensive. They will also substitute
imports from countries not subject to carbon emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol. 20 Therefore,
the size of the national market for energy-intensive products would be smaller not only because of a
reduction in aggregate GDP, but also because of this substitution effect. As demonstrated in the
Introduction, West Virginia manufacturing is concentrated in energy-intensive sectors, and therefore
national demand for the state’s products would also fall for both reasons. The REMI model does
calculate a reduction in national demand for these products from West Virginia, because the state’s
relative electricity prices rise in the scenario, thus increasing relative production costs. Consequently, the
state’s share of these national markets is reduced. Furthermore, lost aggregate GDP cuts the size of
those markets. GDP losses, the national substitution effect, and the state’s increased relative electricity
prices all reduce the state’s national sales of energy-intensive goods, but the magnitude of that impact
would be somewhat greater if the scenario explicitly included national substitution effects.
Second, there are economic activities besides energy production and consumption that generate
greenhouse gases. Primary metals industries, such as steel and aluminum, convert carbon into carbon
dioxide while reducing ores. Aluminum smelting is also the main source of perfluorocarbon emissions.
Coal mining and some chemical processes release methane and other light hydrocarbons that are
sometimes flared or just released into the atmosphere rather than used for energy.
There are also potential positive direct impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on West Virginia’s economy. A
market for carbon sinks could create an additional revenue source for the forestry industry, and forestry
practices could be modified to increase the rate of carbon sequestration. Finally, in the longer term the
Kyoto Protocol or something like it could reduce global warming and its associated costs. In testimony
last year to a committee of the U.S. Senate, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors cited two
studies by William Cline and William Nordhaus that estimated GDP losses of 1.1% and 1.0%,
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Sutherland, Ronald J. et al, The Impact of High Energy Price Scenarios on EnergyIntensive Sectors: Perspectives from Industry Workshops, Argonne National Laboratory, July 1997
discusses these effects on several manufacturing industries including aluminum, steel, and chemicals.
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respectively, from average temperature increases of 4.5 or 5.4 degrees Fahrenheit, respectively. 21
However, there is still a great deal of disagreement among scientists and economists about the extent of
global warming, its impacts on the climate of specific regions, and the associated costs.22
Uncertainties
The Kyoto Protocol direct impact scenario used in this report is a plausible representation of the
policy’s effects on West Virginia’s economy, but it does not represent a firm prediction of the actual
direct impacts that will occur. There are several sources of uncertainty.
First, it is unlikely that the Kyoto Protocol will be adopted in anything like its present form. Second,
rules for implementing many of the flexibility provisions were not laid out in the Protocol. This includes
many elements — such as international trading of carbon emission permits, the Clean Development
Mechanism, and credit for carbon sinks — that would be significant in determining U.S. compliance
costs. Negotiations over these rules have continued at COP-4 in Buenos Aires in November 1998, at
interim technical negotiations, and at COP-5 in Bonn in November 1999. However, these negotiations
have made it apparent that even the agreed flexibility mechanisms are understood differently by other
signatories than by the U.S. Third, carbon emission targets have not yet been negotiated for the period
after 2012. The scenario in this report assumes that the emission target remains the same through 2020.
Debate over the national costs and economic impacts of implementing the Kyoto Protocol has been
vigorous. Many agencies and organizations, in addition to the EIA, have prepared estimates and have
arrived at a wide range of conclusions. RDI states that “up to ... 19% of GDP will be at risk in 2010"
through restricted electricity supply.23 WEFA predicts that GDP would be reduced by up to 3.2% and
that carbon emission permits would cost $265 per metric ton (1992 prices).24 Charles River Associates
estimates GDP reductions of 1.3% and carbon emission permits at $295 per metric ton (1997 prices)
with no international trading, GDP reductions of 0.9% and permits at $119 with unrestricted Annex B

21

Yellen, Janet, Statement on the Economics of the Kyoto Protocol before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, March 5, 1998.
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There is a broad scientific consensus that, as concluded by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) in 1995, “the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human
influence on global climate.” Summaries of the IPCC’s work can be found at http://www.ipcc.ch/.
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Resource Data International, The Kyoto Protocol: Putting US Electricity Supply and
GDP at Risk, February 1998, for Peabody Holding Company, page Ex Sum 2.
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WEFA, Global Warming: The High Cost of the Kyoto Protocol, 1998, pages 1-2.
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trading, and GDP reductions of 0.5% and permits at $50 with global trading. 25 Manne and Richels, two
prominent economists participating in an American Council for Capital Formation forum, predict a
1.0% GDP loss and $240 per metric ton emission rights (1990 prices) with no global trading or 0.25%
GDP loss and emission rights below $70 with full global trading.26 DRI McGraw-Hill forecasts that a
scenario using international trading meeting only 15% of the required reductions of U.S. carbon
emissions would require a permit price of $180 per metric ton (1997 prices) and lead to a maximum
GDP loss of 2.0% in 2007-8, while a scenario with international trading meeting 55% of the required
reductions would lead to a $40 permit price and a 0.7% maximum GDP loss during 2013-2017.27 In
contrast to these estimates, the Administration and Council of Economic Advisors states that with “key
developing country participation” the GDP loss in 2010 could be only 0.07% [sic] with a permit price
of only $14 per ton. 28
A few studies actually estimate net benefits from policies leading to substantial reduction in carbon
emissions (that is, before claiming any benefits from reducing climate change). Prior to the Kyoto
Protocol, a team from five national laboratories in the Department of Energy estimated that a mix of
energy-efficiency and fuel-switching initiatives consistent with a carbon permit price of $50 per metric
ton (1992 prices) could hold U.S. carbon emissions in 2010 to the same level as 1990 with “energy
savings that are roughly equal to or exceed costs.”29 The Tellus Institute has designed a scenario
composed of policies designed to promote faster adoption of energy-efficient technologies that it
predicts would reduce carbon emissions in 2010 to 7% below the 1990 level (that is, complying with
the Kyoto target without any need for international trading) with net annual savings of $46 billion in
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Bernstein, Paul M. and W. David Montgomery, How Much Could Kyoto Really Cost? A
Reconstruction and Reconciliation of Administration Estimates, Charles River Associates, 1998,
page 16.
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Manne, Alan S. and Richard G. Richels, Economic Impacts of Alternative Emission
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DRI-McGraw-Hill, The Impact of Meeting the Kyoto Protocol, 1998, at
http://www.dri.mcgraw-hill.com/kyoto/toc.htm.
28

Administration Economic Analysis, The Kyoto Protocol and the President’s Policies to
Address Climate Change, July 1998, page 53. These estimates are based on the European Union
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Interlaboratory Working Group, Scenarios of U.S. Carbon Reductions: Potential Impacts
of Energy-Efficient and Low-Carbon Technologies by 2010 and Beyond, September 1997,
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2010.30 Similarly, the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy proposes a mix of energyefficiency policies that it predicts would reduce U.S. carbon emissions by 17.2% from a baseline
forecast in 2010 and calculates a net benefit present value of $163 billion that includes both costs and
savings in the period 1999 to 2010.31
The EIA itself produced a range of impact estimates based on scenarios with different rates of carbon
emission reductions, including the 1990 plus 14% scenario used in this report. In 2010 with carbon
emissions 24% above 1990 (the baseline predicts emissions 33% above 1990), the EIA forecasts a
1.0% loss of GDP and a carbon price of $67 per metric ton (1996 prices). On the other hand, if
carbon emissions in 2010 were 7% less than 1990, the EIA forecasts a 4.2% loss of GDP and a
carbon price of $348.32
As already suggested several times above, one of the main reasons for this wide range of cost and
impact estimates is the variety of predictions on the extent of international carbon permit trading that will
be allowed. Other important distinctions between more optimistic and pessimistic assessments of the
Protocol’s costs include the expected rate of technological progress regarding energy efficiency,
treatment of the fiscal effects of a carbon tax or auction — specifically whether and how the resulting
government revenue is reinjected into the economy, and whether the costs of replacing less energyefficient capital equipment prematurely are accounted for. Finally, studies based on econometric or
general equilibrium models generally estimate greater compliance costs than studies that catalog the
costs and savings of implementing specific carbon-emission reducing technologies, because the former
are less sanguine about the ease and rapidity of widely adopting new technologies.

Economic Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol
Figures 3 through 9 and Tables 2 through 8 summarize the Kyoto Protocol’s estimated economic
impacts on output, gross state product (GSP), employment, wage rates, total wage and salary earnings,
personal incomes, and population in West Virginia. The figures graph totals for both the baseline and
Kyoto Protocol scenarios for each year from 1997 through 2020. The tables report results for the
illustrative years of 1997, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020. The tables also include industry division
detail except for personal income and population, which includes age cohort detail.
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General Observations
Four general observations apply across the impacted variables:
! The timing of the impacts reflects the timing of the Kyoto Protocol scenario. There are no
impacts until 2005, which is the first year that the policy scenario deviates from the baseline
scenario. Between 2005 and 2010 all of the impacts become worse as the direct impacts on
national GDP, West Virginia coal production, state production of electricity, and electricity
prices all increase. From 2010 to 2020 the impacts remain negative, but the trends are mixed.
In this period increased losses in state production of coal and electricity are offset by partial
recovery of national GDP towards the baseline scenario.
! Growth in output, GSP, and especially employment shows a temporary slowdown in 1999.
This is the result of a national slowdown — forecast annual GDP growth of 2.0% compared to
an average annual rate of 2.6% over the 1996 to 2010 period.
! The magnitudes of the impacts are quite large compared to the overall size of the state’s
economy. The largest impacts are -9.9% for output in 2019, -9.9% of GSP again in 2019, 5.5% of employment in 2014, -3.8% in the annual wage rate during 2015 through 2017,
-8.8% of total wage and salary earnings in 2014 through 2016, -1.6% of per capita income in
2010, and -3.9% of population in 2020.33
! The national and state economies would take a very long time to fully adjust to the Kyoto
Protocol. This is reflected in the direct impact scenario derived from the EIA’s national
modeling, which has GDP and energy market impacts still changing in 2020. The West Virginia
economy’s dynamics represented in the REMI model also includes long lags in adjustments of
production and the labor market.
Output and GSP
Output (Figure 3 and Table 2) and GSP (Figure 4 and Table 3) are both measures of the value of
production and behave in a similar fashion. The results are presented in 1992 dollars to remove the
effect of inflation over the extended period of the impact simulation. Output is the sum of the value of
goods and services produced by each business in the state. GSP is the value added by those businesses
while producing those goods and services. Output includes the value of purchased intermediate inputs
(parts, supplies, business services) that are embodied in a business’ product or service. GSP excludes
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Some care should be used in comparing one figure to another, because the scales on the
vertical axes were selected to cover growth over the forecast period, and predicted growth of some
variables is much more rapid than for others. For example, in Figure 5 the 60 thousand range of the
scale is less than 10% of the initial (1997) level of employment, while in Figure 7 the $30 billion range is
nearly double the initial wages and salaries. In percentage terms the impact on wages and salaries in
2020 (-7.7%) is larger than the impact on employment (-4.9%), but it doesn’t look that way if the
scales are ignored.
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the value of those intermediate inputs and includes only the additional value that the business creates
with its factors of production (labor, capital, land).
! The Kyoto Protocol reduces West Virginia output and GSP starting in 2005. The largest
impacts are in transportation and public utilities (which includes electricity) and mining. In 2005
these two sectors account for 60.2% of output impacts and 62.4% of GSP impacts. The
remaining sectors of the economy are affected by reductions in demand due to both the cuts in
GDP and also the loss of coal and utility revenues that could have recirculated in the state
economy. Increases in the price of electricity also begin to reduce competitiveness of the state’s
industries.
! By 2020 the share of the mining and the transportation and public utilities sectors in the impacts
is even greater — 71.6% of output and 71.8% of GSP. Between 2015 and 2020 the size of
the output and GSP impacts on the other sectors actually decreases. The reason for this split
pattern is that coal and electricity production are still decreasing in the policy scenario while
national GDP partially recovers.
Employment
Employment impacts (Figure 5 and Table 4) parallel output and GSP impacts because businesses
employ workers in order to make their products.
! Employment impacts are spread more evenly among divisions of West Virginia’s economy than
are the output and GSP impacts. Services, retail trade, and construction have employment
impacts that are larger than transportation and public utilities or mining in the early years of the
scenario. The services sector still has the largest employment impact in 2020. The reason is that
the electricity and mining sectors are very capital-intensive, while some of the divisions affected
by the general reduction in demand, population, and incomes (retail, services) are more laborintensive.
! In percentage terms, the impacts on employment are smaller than the impacts on output — 1.0% versus -2.0% in 2005, -4.9% versus -8.1% in 2010, and -4.9% versus -9.6% in 2020.
The labor market’s initial reaction to cuts in employment is a reduction in the wage rate, which
induces businesses to keep some of the employees that would otherwise be lost. In addition,
the output losses are concentrated in sectors, mining and public utilities, that do not hire many
workers per dollar of output.
Wages
The annual wage rates in Figure 6 and Table 5 are expressed in current dollars per employee. Total
wage and salary earnings (Figure 7 and Table 6) are also in current dollars for the West Virginia
economy. Total wages and salaries is the product of employment and the annual wage rate, so its
impacts depend on employment and wage rate impacts.
! The annual wage rate as well as total wages and salaries increase steadily in both the control
and Kyoto Protocol scenarios. The annual wage rate starts at $20,298 in 1997 and increases
16
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to $45,557 in the control forecast or to $44,047 in the Kyoto forecast by 2020. Total wage
and salary earnings grow from $17.4 billion in 1997 to $41.3 billion in the control forecast or to
$38.1 billion in the Kyoto forecast in 2020.
Aggregate annual wage rate impacts climb steadily from 2005 through 2015 and then hold
relatively stable. However, the sectoral composition continues to change. From 2015 to 2020
the wage rate impacts get larger for transportation and public utilities, mining, and construction,
but smaller for the other divisions.
Wage rate impacts are much larger in the mining, and especially the transportation and public
utility divisions, than in any other sector. This pattern holds throughout the forecast period.
Aggregate impacts on wage and salary earnings also climb steadily from 2005 through 2015
and then hold stable. Again, after 2015 the impacts on transportation and public utilities, mining,
and construction continue to get larger while they start to shrink for most of the other divisions.
In 2005 the Protocol’s impacts on wages and salaries are largest in transportation and public
utilities and in mining. By 2010 and thereafter, the impact on earnings in services ranks second,
behind transportation and public utilities but before mining.

Income
Personal income and per capita income expressed in constant dollars (1992 prices) are useful measures
of the population’s financial well-being (Figure 8 and Table 7). Personal income impacts depend on the
components of personal income, especially wages and salaries. Population changes also contribute to
impacts on per capita income.
! Even though the Kyoto Protocol’s impact on West Virginia total personal income continues to
get larger every year through 2020, its impact on per capita personal income peaks in 2010. By
2020 the impact on per capita income is effectively zero. The reason the per capita income
impacts shrink back towards zero after 2010 is that the influence of population losses overtakes
the influence of reductions in total personal income.
! In the early years of the forecast, changes in wage and salary earnings explain almost all of the
impact on total personal income (over 100% in 2005 and 95.1% in 2010). Eventually, impacts
on proprietors’ income; dividends, interest, and rents; and transfer payments play a larger role,
and earnings impacts are not quite as important (85.5% in 2020).
! Even though real per capita income and disposable (i.e., after-tax) per capita income grow in
both the control and scenario forecasts, West Virginia’s disposable per capita income falls
further behind national per capita income. In 1997 the state’s disposable per capita income is
88.0% of the national average, but by 2020 it is only 81.4% in the control scenario forecast.
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Population
Births, deaths, aging, and migration determine changes in West Virginia’s population (Figure 9 and
Table 8).
! Population impacts accumulate over extended periods of time as a result of migration. At the
end of the forecast period the Kyoto Protocol’s population impacts are still growing — from 63,428 people in 2019 to -66,066 in 2020.
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Appendix: Computation of Scenario Values
Most elements of the scenario are based on the EIA’s projections for the case with carbon emissions
equal to 1990 plus 14 percent starting in 2008.34 Tables in the report show projections for each case in
2005 (anticipatory effects), 2010, and 2020. The changes in GDP for those years are calculated by
comparing EIA’s reference case to this 1990 plus 14 percent case. Changes for the intervening years
are interpolated.
EIA projects Appalachian coal production in tons for each of its cases in 2005, 2010, and 2020.
Again, a percentage change is computed by comparing the 1990 plus 14 percent case with the
reference case. The direct impact on West Virginia coal production is assumed to be the same in
percentage terms as the Appalachian impacts. In REMI’s West Virginia control forecast for 1996, coal
accounts for 85% of all mining output. Therefore, using 2005 as an example, the change in mining sales
is:
(-5.4%)*0.85 = -4.6%
EIA also projects electricity generated in billions of kilowatthours by fuel type for each case. Since
coal-fired generation accounted for 99.3% of electricity produced in West Virginia in 1998,35 the
scenario assumes that the state’s electricity production changes in the same proportions as EIA predicts
for coal-fired electricity production nationally. In REMI’s national control forecast for 1996, electricity
output is 69.5% of all public utility output, which also includes gas transmission and distribution, water,
and sanitary services. Electricity’s share in West Virginia is only 40.8%, but that figure is misleading.
West Virginia is a large exporter of electricity — during 1998 in-state consumers used only 29.6% of
the power generated at utility power plants in the state.36 However, the available data on electricity
sales only measures the sales to ultimate in-state consumers. Thus, this data under-represents
electricity’s share of public utility sector output in West Virginia. The actual share should be somewhat
greater than the national share and is assumed to be 80%. Therefore, again using 2005 as an example,
the change in public utility sales is:
(-9.9%)*0.8 = -7.9%
The reductions in coal mining and coal-fired electricity generation imply that coal will lose its advantage
as a low-cost fuel under the Kyoto Protocol. This is to be expected since coal is the most carbon34

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy
Markets and Economic Activity, October 1998, Appendix B.
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U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual 1998, Volume 1, Tables
A1 and A2.
36

Computed from U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual 1998,
Volume 1, Tables A1 and A11.
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intensive fuel. Coal produced in West Virginia averages about 87% carbon by weight and 12,351
Btu/lb.37 To calculate what the price of carbon emission permits could do to the cost of generating coalfired electricity, first translate energy content into Btu/metric ton:
12,351*2000/0.907 = 27,234,840 Btu/metric ton
Then a carbon-emission price of $129 per metric ton would translate into:
129*1000*0.87/27,234,840 = 0.00412 mills/Btu
To change units from Btu’s to kWh’s requires the average heat rate in the state’s coal-fired electric
generating units. In 1998 coal from West Virginia averaged 12,351Btu/lb, and the state’s power plants
generated 89,008 million kWh of electricity while burning 35,132 thousand tons of coal.38 Thus, the
average heat rate is:
12,351*2,000*(35,132/89,008,000) = 9,777 Btu/kWh
Finally, the cost for the carbon emissions associated with coal-fired generation of a kWh would be:
0.00412*9,777 = 40.3 mills/kWh
Thus, West Virginia will lose its advantage in low-cost electricity. On the other hand, the substantial
transmission capacity currently used to export electricity will make it easy to import electricity if the
state’s coal-fired power plants shut down. Therefore electricity prices should not rise to much more
than the national average.
The REMI control forecast has West Virginia’s industrial electricity costs holding steady at 70.1% of
the national average and commercial electricity costs at 71.8% of the national average. To reach 100%
of the national average in 2010, industrial electricity costs would have to increase by:
(1-0.701)/0.701 = 42.7%
Commercial industrial electricity costs would have to increase by
(1-0.718)/0.718 = 39.3%
In 1998 revenues from residential electricity sales averaged 6.3¢/kWh in West Virginia and 8.27¢/kWh
nationally.39 With electricity assumed to account for 20% of household operating expenses, the price of
those expenses would increase in 2010 by:
(8.27/6.3)*0.2 = 6.3%

37

In 1998 sulfur was 1.52% and ash 11.50%. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Cost
and Quality of Fuels for Electric Utility Plants 1998 Tables, June 1999, Table ES3.
38

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Cost and Quality of Fuels for Electric Utility
Plants 1998 Tables, June 1999, Table ES3, and Electric Power Annual 1998, Volume 1, Tables A2
and A5.
39

U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Annual 1998, Volume 1, Table

A15.
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Table 1
West Virginia Employment, Earnings & Gross State
Product (GSP) of Selected Industries
Employment Earnings*
Industry
SIC
1997
1997
West Virginia
864,305
17,355

GSP*
1997
38,228

Mining
Coal mining
Oil and gas extraction

12
13

28,843
20,289
7,457

1,492
1,284
168

3,154
2,886
204

Manufacturing
Lumber and wood products
Stone, clay, and glass products
Primary metal industries
Chemicals and allied products

24
32
33
29

85,875
12,171
6,432
11,861
15,114

3,337
290
196
637
991

6,684
447
341
827
3,065

Transportation and public utilities
Electric, gas, and sanitary services

49

45,135
10,782

1,682
597

4,672
2,605

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, State Personal
Income 1929-1997 , and Gross Product by Industry for U.S. and States, 1977-97 , CD-ROMs.
*Note: Earnings and GSP expressed in millions of current dollars.

Total Output
Baseline Forecast
Kyoto Policy Forecast
Difference

Table 2
Industry Output Impact of Kyoto Protocol
1997
2000
2005
2010
58,541
61,109
67,042
72,396
58,541
61,109
65,671
66,501
0
0
-1,371
-5,895

Differences by Division
Mining
Construction
Durable Manufacturing
Nondurable Manufacturing
Transportation & Public Utilities
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate
Retail
Wholesale
Services
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing

1997
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Note: Industry Output measured in millions of 1992 dollars.

2005
-325
-136
-62
-61
-501
-53
-68
-61
-103
-1

2010
-1,472
-533
-234
-238
-2,093
-253
-317
-270
-478
-6

2015
77,822
70,457
-7,365

2020
82,708
74,749
-7,959

2015
-1,835
-552
-309
-301
-2,843
-288
-358
-330
-544
-6

2020
-2,165
-527
-231
-205
-3,534
-227
-310
-314
-440
-6

Gross State Product
Baseline Forecast
Kyoto Policy Forecast
Difference

Table 3
Gross State Product Impact of Kyoto Protocol
1997
2000
2005
2010
37,628
39,342
43,084
46,278
37,628
39,342
42,236
42,557
0
0
-848
-3,721

Differences by Division
Mining
Construction
Durable Manufacturing
Nondurable Manufacturing
Transportation & Public Utilities
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate
Retail
Wholesale
Services
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing
Government
Farm

1997
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Note: GSP measured in millions of 1992 dollars.

2000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2005
-225
-68
-25
-27
-304
-35
-43
-43
-63
-1
-14
0

2010
-1,014
-264
-93
-105
-1,275
-170
-208
-190
-289
-3
-110
0

2015
49,475
44,800
-4,675

2020
52,362
47,283
-5,079

2015
-1,263
-274
-122
-134
-1,733
-194
-236
-232
-328
-3
-156
0

2020
-1,491
-260
-89
-92
-2,157
-153
-205
-221
-264
-3
-144
0

Total Employment
Baseline Forecast
Kyoto Policy Forecast
Difference

Table 4
Employment Impact of Kyoto Protocol
1997
2000
2005
2010
845,460 851,883 871,418 877,025
845,460 851,883 862,657 834,235
0
0
-8,761
-42,790

Differences by Division
Mining
Construction
Durable Manufacturing
Nondurable Manufacturing
Transportation & Public Utilities
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate
Retail
Wholesale
Services
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing
Government
Farm

1997
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2005
-1,247
-1,540
-402
-175
-1,353
-249
-1,216
-442
-1,631
-68
-438
0

2010
-4,525
-6,178
-1,190
-665
-5,610
-1,463
-7,117
-1,976
-10,189
-314
-3,564
0

2015
881,294
833,453
-47,841

2020
879,368
836,686
-42,682

2015
-4,653
-6,212
-1,289
-761
-6,984
-1,610
-7,512
-2,246
-11,259
-344
-4,970
0

2020
-4,522
-5,749
-719
-500
-7,830
-1,262
-6,083
-1,998
-9,176
-294
-4,549
0

Annual Wage Rate
Baseline Forecast
Kyoto Policy Forecast
Difference

Table 5
Annual Wage Rate Impact of Kyoto Protocol
1997
2000
2005
2010
20,298
22,452
26,062
31,505
20,298
22,452
25,942
30,600
0
0
-120
-905

Differences by Division
Mining
Construction
Durable Manufacturing
Nondurable Manufacturing
Transportation & Public Utilities
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate
Retail
Wholesale
Services
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing

1997
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Note: Annual Wage Rate measured in current dollars.

2005
-241
-95
-67
-89
-530
-14
-12
-40
2
-13

2010
-2,301
-1,051
-833
-1,218
-3,293
-449
-276
-761
-403
-249

2015
37,966
36,523
-1,443

2020
45,557
44,047
-1,510

2015
-4,456
-1,741
-1,450
-2,058
-5,454
-753
-454
-1,256
-681
-403

2020
-5,985
-1,828
-1,259
-1,797
-7,544
-654
-361
-1,036
-513
-313

Table 6
Total Wages & Salaries Impact of Kyoto Protocol
Total Wages & Salaries
1997
2000
2005
2010
Baseline Forecast
17,441
19,511
23,257
28,368
Kyoto Policy Forecast
17,441
19,511
22,932
26,265
Difference
0
0
-325
-2,103
Differences by Division
Mining
Construction
Durable Manufacturing
Nondurable Manufacturing
Transportation & Public Utilities
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate
Retail
Wholesale
Services
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing

1997
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2005
-65
-42
-19
-12
-80
-6
-20
-18
-37
-1

Note: Wages and Salaries measured in millions of current dollars.

2010
-282
-226
-93
-81
-418
-58
-166
-114
-403
-7

2015
34,423
31,400
-3,023

2020
41,293
38,105
-3,188

2015
-344
-295
-134
-122
-639
-84
-226
-165
-589
-9

2020
-387
-326
-99
-101
-857
-76
-207
-167
-541
-9

Total Personal Income
Baseline Forecast
Kyoto Policy Forecast
Difference
Per Capita Personal Income
Baseline Forecast
Kyoto Policy Forecast
Difference

Table 7
Personal Income Impact of Kyoto
1997
2000
2005
2010
34,951
36,499
38,450
40,511
34,951
36,499
38,180
39,167
0
0
-270
-1,344
1997
19,337
19,337
0

2000
20,754
20,754
0

2005
22,588
22,461
-127

2010
24,162
23,769
-393

2015
42,626
41,015
-1,611

2020
44,699
42,957
-1,742

2015
25,378
25,187
-191

2020
26,341
26,340
-1

Note: Total Personal Income measured in millions of 1992 dollars; Per Capita Income
measured in 1992 dollars.

Total Population
Baseline Forecast
Kyoto Policy Forecast
Difference
Differences by Sex & Age
Male
0 -14
15 -24
25 -64
65+
Female
0 -14
15 -24
25 -64
65+

Table 8
Total Population Impact of Kyoto Protocol
1997
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
1,807,444 1,758,945 1,702,245 1,676,625 1,679,632 1,696,939
1,807,444 1,758,945 1,699,838 1,647,825 1,628,417 1,630,873
0
0
-2,407
-28,800
-51,215
-66,066
1997

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

-421
-248
-564
-3

-5,108
-2,729
-6,584
-88

-8,847
-4,256
-12,114
-366

-10,311
-5,672
-16,151
-774

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

-399
-274
-497
-3

-4,840
-2,967
-6,386
-94

-8,443
-4,387
-12,403
-400

-9,907
-5,562
-16,845
-849
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Kyoto Protocol: Annual Wage Rate
In Thousands $s
55

45

Baseline
Kyoto

35

25

15
1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

Figure 7
Kyoto Protocol: Wages and Salaries
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